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INTRODUCTION
The target of this comment is a recent
and welcome paper (Gamez, 2014) that
addresses foundational issues for neural-
correlates-of-consciousness empiricism.
This comment discusses whether Gamez’
assumptions actually allow the suggested
framework to support the kind of theory-
discrimination necessary for advancing
the field. Specifically, present discussions
solely concern the theory-discrimination
consequences of assumption A4, which
states that all detailed features of conscious
experience are first-person-reportable
(at least, in principle). The present
claim is that A4 limits subsequent
theory-discrimination such that Gamez’
approach is incapable of addressing cer-
tain centrally-significant controversies
in the field. This claim is not meant
to demean the value of Gamez’ con-
tribution, but rather to draw attention
to still-unresolved issues. The primary
challenges to A4 justified and discussed
here are explicit cases in which cer-
tain details of conscious experience are
not fully reportable (although these
details are of course experienced by the
subject).
ORIENTING EXAMPLE OF A
THEORY-DISCRIMINATION PROBLEM
IN CONSCIOUSNESS RESEARCH
Consider two alternative theories for
spatiotemporal structures (Gamez, p. 2)
directly associated (Gamez, p. 4) with
conscious experience (Figures 1A,B).
According to theory-I, activity in a rel-
atively early area, S2 say, is directly
associated, whereas according to theory-
II, the direct associate is activity in a later
area C1 that e-causally (Gamez, p. 6)
receives information (Shannon, 1948)
from S2. By construction of theory-I and
theory-II, area S2 dynamically encodes
some information concerning the exter-
nal environment that cannot be decoded
from C1-dynamics. Put differently, the
e-causal transfer of dynamically-encoded
information from S2 to C1 e.g., via S3,
loses some details in granularity of rep-
resentation. (In Figure 1, granularity
is illustratively depictedas degree-of-
spatial-resolution, although in principle
it could relate to any aspect of conscious
experience potentially associated with
multiple hierarchical representations in
brain-dynamical encoding). Crucially,
both theory-I and theory-II suppose (by
construction) that first-person report is
limited to information encoded in C1-
activity (because report-governing area
R3 is presumed e-causally connected to
S2-encoded information only via C1), so
that first-person report definitively can-
not reflect the granularity available e.g.,
from detailed third-person decoding of S2-
activity using complete knowledge of both
S2-dynamics and neural codes. Under
Gamez’ causality assumptions, neural-
correlates-of-consciousness approaches
cannot discriminate between theory-I and
theory-II in order to establish whether it
is S2 or C1 that is directly associated with
consciousness, because first-person report
and neural dynamics are identical under
the two theories (Figures 1A,B).
IMPLICATIONS FOR GAMEZ’
FRAMEWORK
The type of theory-discrimination inher-
ent in the theory-I/theory-II example
is excluded by Gamez’ assumption A4:
theory-I contains aspects of conscious
experience not available even in-principle
for first-person report, and therefore
lies outside the framework of Gamez
(2014). Thus, the inability of first-
person-report-based methodologies to
perform theory-I/theory-II discrimina-
tion does not invalidate Gamez’ claims
that his framework provides for con-
sistent empiricism. But this inability
does draw attention to limitations not
fully emphasized by Gamez, and leads
naturally to two questions. First, are
theory-discriminations of the theory-
I/theory-II kind relevant to advancing
the field? (If not, then observations here
are only of minor interest, although
the relevance of the theory-I/theory-
II contrast to past controversies in the
field follows from direct correspondence
with the seminal considerations of Crick
and Koch, 1995). Second, if making
assumption A4 does establish a significant
limitation on Gamez’ framework, are
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FIGURE 1 | Assuming completeness of first-person report can lead to
unreliable neural-correlates conclusions. Pictorial conventions and
notation follow Figure 4 in Gamez (2014). (A) “Theory-I”: conscious
experience is directly associated with a relatively early area S2 that encodes
the visual scene at a fine-grained resolution; report is based on
coarse-grained resolution encoded in C1, and does not fully reflect
experience. (B) “Theory-II”: conscious experience is directly associated with
the later area C1 that encodes at a coarse-grained resolution; report is based
on coarse-grained resolution encoded in C1. If completeness of first-person
report is assumed, a neural-correlates approach collecting first-person and
brain-dynamical data (identical in A,B) leads to false certainty that theory-II is
correct. (C) “Theory-III”: conscious experience is associated with both S2
and C1; report is based on C1. For example, S2 might provide fine
perceptual detail to conscious experience, while C1 provides context,
contours etc. (D) Imagination of experience, assuming theory-III is correct: if
imagination evokes activity in C1 but not S2, and C1 provides only
coarse-grained detail, then the imagined experience is not the same as that
in the stimulus-driven setting (C) (absence of S2-participation in conscious
experience schematically indicated by graying of associative arrow). If
completeness of first-person report is assumed, a neural-correlates
approach contrasting stimulus-driven and imagined experiences (C,D) will
incorrectly eliminate theory-III in favor of theory-II (B).
there alternative assumptions providing
a logically-consistent basis for theory-
I/theory-II style discriminations whilst
preserving rigor and theory-neutrality
(Gamez, 2014)?
RELEVANCE OF EXAMPLE-EVOKED
ISSUES TO THE FIELD
Concerning the first question, one might
object that S2-associated theories are
implausible, for example because they
are not consistent with empirical data. The
primary weakness of such objections is
that they typically appeal to consistency
with first-person report that is precisely
at issue in the theory-I/theory-II contrast.
For example, one might claim that first-
person-reported properties of conscious
experience are not consistent with known
dynamical-encoding regularities pertain-
ing to S2-activity. But this objection
presumes that first-person-report is accu-
rate in full detail, as is precisely excluded
by theory-I. Setting aside empirically-
based objections, it is straightforward to
construct further theory-contrasts that
create the same challenges as the exam-
ple, and are closer to certain central
controversies in the field. For example,
consider discrimination between theory-
II and another theory-III (Figure 1C),
that proposes conscious experience is
associated with both S2 and C1. (For
example, C1-activity might be associated
with large scale features such as shapes
and contours, and S2-activity might
provide a supplementary level of vivid
detail). Controversies of the theory-II/
theory-III kind are certainly longstand-
ing, lively and ongoing (Sperling, 1960;
Block, 2007; Cohen and Dennett, 2011;
Navajas et al., 2014), thus establish-
ing the relevance of example-evoked
issues to the field. Case-by-case demon-
stration that every empirical method
mentioned by Gamez fails discrimi-
natorily is beyond the present article’s
scope, but Figure 1 illustrates problems
for Gamez’ closest suggestion for S2/C1-
resolution, namely a contrast between
stimulus-evoked (Figure 1C) and imag-
ined (Figure 1D) experiences (Gamez, p.
10). Finally, theory-II/theory-III debates
go beyond the constraints acknowledged
in Gamez (2014) (e.g., the exclusion of
micro-consciousness style theories Zeki
and Bartels, 1999).
WHAT ASSUMPTIONS EXTEND THE
REACH OF THEORY-DISCRIMINATION
WHILST PRESERVING RIGOR?
Turning to the second question, note
that theory-I/theory-II discrimination
problems cannot be avoided by adopting
identity-theory (Kim, 1998). For exam-
ple, even assuming conscious experience
is in some sense metaphysically identi-
cal to neural activity, there is insufficient
data (Figures 1A,B) to resolve an S2-
identical theory-I from a C1-identical
theory-II.
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The present article’s scope does not
admit full exploration of frameworks that
can both support theory-discriminations
of the kind highlighted here and pre-
serve Gamez’ refreshing level of care.
To set the stage for future work in this
direction, it is perhaps helpful to con-
trast approaches of Gamez (2014) and
Chalmers (1996). Chalmers (Ch. 5) raises
problems related to phenomenal judg-
ment, and appeals to a pre-experimental
bridging principle based on func-
tionalism (Ch. 6) to exclude S2-style
possibilities. As well as compromis-
ing Gamez’ theory-neutrality by virtue
of the functionalist appeal, Chalmers’
phenomenal-judgment explanation can
be directly criticized for its reliance on
non-physical cognition, because this
seems to contradict the general tenor
of a causal-closure-of-the-physical set-
ting. Gamez’ A4 instead excludes S2-style
possibilities directly, but limitations
on theory-discrimination then return
us to Chalmers’ original phenomenal-
judgment-associated concern: especially
under causal closure, what level of objec-
tive, scientific, confidence can be given
to subjectively-powerful intuitions that
brain-based report does accurately reflect
details of conscious experience?
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